

FEB 25 1952

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y  
O F F I C E O F N A T I O N A L E S T I M A T E S

25 February 1952

SUBJECT: NIE-49: SWEDEN'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT  
(Revised draft for Board consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To assess: (a) Sweden's strategic importance; (b) its present policy in the East-West conflict; (c) the possibilities of a change in this policy; and (d) the consequences of Sweden's possible policies to the NATO powers and the USSR.

CONCLUSIONS

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ~~(C) 1991~~  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ~~3/16/81~~ REVIEWER: ~~009256~~  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: ~~3/16/81~~

1. Sweden's geographic location, sizable economic resources, and considerable military potential give it substantial strategic importance to both NATO and the USSR. Of chief importance is Sweden's potential role in the defense of Scandinavia, and particularly Norway, against a

Soviet attack.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Despite its pro-Western and anti-Communist outlook, Sweden will probably cling to its "alliance-free" policy as long as possible, even in event of war.

3. However, Sweden might join the NATO powers in event of a Soviet attack on Norway, provided that the NATO forces could come quickly to its defense. Moreover, Sweden would certainly fight if itself attacked.

4. The chief consequence of Sweden's neutrality policy is that it seriously hampers the development of adequate Scandinavian defenses and leaves Scandinavia highly vulnerable to a Soviet attack. Until the NATO powers themselves are strong enough to defend at least Norway, the active participation of Swedish forces might well be essential to the defense of key Scandinavian base areas in event of war.

5. If Sweden remained neutral in event of war while the USSR occupied Norway, Sweden would <sup>be</sup> effectively isolated from the West. Its valuable trade with the West would be cut off and it would be forced, under Soviet economic pressure, to make an important contribution to the Soviet war economy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. Once NATO becomes strong enough to defend Norway in event of war, Swedish neutrality would no longer be so disadvantageous to the NATO powers and Sweden could no longer be wholly cut off from the West. Swedish neutrality would still benefit the USSR, however, as it would deny the West the use of Swedish forces and bases for possible offensive operations against the Soviet Baltic flank.

#### DISCUSSION

##### I. SWEDEN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

1. Geographic. The Scandinavian peninsula, of which Sweden forms the greater part, lies across the most direct air approaches to Western USSR from air bases in North America, Greenland, Iceland, and the UK, or from carriers in the Norwegian Sea. Conversely, it lies athwart the air path from Soviet bases in the Moscow area to most of the UK, Greenland, Iceland, and North America. It could provide offensive and defensive air and early warning facilities to either the USSR or the Western allies. It also occupies a

SECRET

strategic position with respect to control of the Baltic and its entrance. Moreover, Sweden lies across the most feasible [supply] routes between the USSR and the valuable air and naval base sites along the Norwegian coast. Finally, Sweden overhangs the North German plain, the chief military route across Western Europe, and if held securely by the NATO powers, could be used as a base from which to threaten Soviet lines of communication across Germany as well as the Soviet Baltic flank.

2. Political, Economic and Scientific. Sweden is a stable, politically mature democracy of about seven million people. Its present Social Democratic-Agrarian coalition government enjoys solid popular support. Sweden has only a small Communist party, numbering an estimated 35,000, which has been declining in strength.

3. As one of the most highly industrialized nations in the world, Sweden is an important producer of ships, ball and roller bearings, industrial machinery, engines and turbines, electrical apparatus, steel, armaments, and numerous other manufactures, as well as high quality iron ore.

SECRET

The swedish Bofors firm designs and produces excellent naval and anti-aircraft guns. Sweden's aircraft industry is capable of producing limited numbers of modern jet fighters. Its marine engineering and aeronautical installations are capable of extensive research and development work. Sweden's basic scientific and technological research is excellent in a number of fields. Its scientists rank with the world's best in ferrous metallurgy and medicine, for example, and it expects to have an underground atomic pile operating in 1953.

4. Some 92-93% of Swedish trade is with the West, the UK and West Germany being Sweden's largest customers. Sweden's large exports of iron ore, lumber, pulp and paper, bearings, machinery and ships, etc., make an important contribution to Western European economic strength. For example, about 11% of the free world's iron is derived from Swedish ore. The West German and UK steel industries are particularly dependent upon Swedish ore imports, which account for perhaps 60% of West German and 30% of UK steel production.

SECRET

5. Although trade with the Soviet Bloc is of more importance to Sweden than to most other Western European countries, it accounts for only 7-8% of total Swedish trade. It consists chiefly of an exchange of iron ore, ball and roller bearings, and machinery for coal and some mineral ores. This trade has been declining steadily over recent years, and under Western pressure Sweden has adopted East-West trade controls comparable to those of the European NATO countries. It sells no munitions to the Soviet Bloc and only surrenders strategic goods, such as iron ore and ball-bearings, where necessary to obtain such essential imports as Polish coal.

6. However, Sweden's dependence on foreign sources for two-thirds of its raw materials and practically all of its coal, coke, and petroleum products renders its economy critically vulnerable to external pressures. Any major interference with the flow of imports such as would occur in wartime would inevitably have serious disruptive effects on the Swedish economy.

7. Armed Forces. Sweden is modernizing and expanding its 75,000 man armed forces. These forces are the largest and best in Scandinavia, although far less than Sweden's resources can support. While the forthcoming defense

SECRET

budget will probably be more than 40% above that of the present fiscal year, Sweden will still be spending only 5% of its national income for defense. It is building modern jet aircraft (and buying others from the UK), enlarging and modernizing its fleet and expanding ground force training. However, the armed forces suffer from serious weaknesses which would sharply limit their capabilities in time of war. The quality of Swedish manpower and basic training is excellent, but the armed forces are lacking in combat experience and in staff and command training for large scale operations. Serious logistic deficiencies also exist.

8. Sweden's army of 50,000 comprises only 15,000 regulars, although mobilizable army manpower totals some 675,000 men, most of them semi-trained. The 9-10 month conscription period is inadequate by NATO standards. Many items of modern equipment, such as tanks, heavy artillery, and electronic equipment are obsolete, in short supply, or completely lacking.

9. Sweden's navy is a well-rounded combat force designed for coastal defense. It is noteworthy for high standards of seamanship, materiel, maintenance and discipline, but its effectiveness against attack by a major

SECRET

power like the USSR, would be strictly limited to harassing and delaying tactics and escort operations. The main units are three cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twenty-one submarines. The navy is weak in modern equipment, though a new construction and modernization program is in progress. By the end of 1952, for example, all submarines will be fitted with radar, sonar, and snorkels.

10. The Air Force, second strongest in Western Europe, is considered by Sweden to be its first line of defense. It has 1,688 aircraft (1,095 of them in operational units), of which 366 are jets. Of Sweden's 62 airfields, six can now sustain jet fighter or medium bomber operations, four more can sustain jet fighters and be developed for bombers, and a further ten can support limited jet fighter operations. Sweden's air defenses have been greatly improved

25X6

25X6

[REDACTED] but the air forces equipment is inferior to that of the USSR, and it suffers from critical logistic deficiencies, particularly fuel.

SECRET

11. In the light of their military weaknesses, the Swedish forces are presently capable only of fighting delaying actions against a major Soviet attack. The duration of their defensive effort would depend upon whether they had sufficient time to mobilize and upon the receipt of substantial outside support. On the other hand, Sweden's already sizeable military potential and resources provide the base for a marked expansion in Swedish military capabilities, perhaps to the point where, together with the NATO Northern Command forces, they could successfully defend large areas of Scandinavia. Such a build-up of Swedish defenses, however, would require outside assistance.

12. Sweden's role in Scandinavian defense. The ultimate test of Sweden's strategic importance to the USSR and the NATO powers lies in its potential role in the defense of the Scandinavian peninsula in event of war. Should war come, the chief objective of both sides would probably be to control the valuable air and naval bases and radar sites along the Norwegian coast. Sweden, because of its strategic location and sizable armed forces,

SECRET

might well be of critical importance to Norway's defense. While Sweden's strategic importance to the NATO powers is primarily defensive, once these powers were strong enough to defend the Scandinavian peninsula (and perhaps Denmark), Sweden would have potential value as a base for offensive air and perhaps eventually naval and amphibious operations against the Soviet Baltic flank.

II. SWEDEN'S PRESENT POLICY IN THE EAST-WEST CONFLICT

13. The Swedish people and government remain firmly attached to their traditional policy of "freedom from military alliances". To the Swedish public, which overwhelmingly supports the "no-alliance" policy, the most persuasive argument in its behalf is the peace that the country has enjoyed for approximately 150 years. Although cognizant of the Soviet threat to Swedish security, the Swedes are not convinced that involvement in a future war is inevitable and they believe they can maintain their armed forces at a level that would deter any invasion. They are under no delusion that they

SECRET

could withstand attack without Western support, but they are confident that, regardless of their non-membership in NATO, the Western powers would come to their assistance in event of Soviet attack.

14. While all four non-Communist parties support in principle the no-alliance policy, <sup>1/</sup> the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative opposition parties have criticized the implementation of the policy by the Social Democratic-Agrarian Government as being too rigid, doctrinaire, and lacking in foresight. They contend that at a minimum Sweden should undertake technical military cooperation with Denmark and Norway, in order to facilitate Western aid to Sweden in event of war. They also profess great concern over the impact of Sweden's official neutrality policy on Western opinion. A small but vocal minority led by some of the Liberal party press, including Sweden's largest daily, has gone further and attacked the neutrality policy, arguing that better security would be found in affiliation with NATO.

---

<sup>1/</sup> Sweden's small Communist party, while not objecting to neutrality as such, professes to regard it as a fraud, alleging that Swedish foreign policy is actually pro-Western and non-neutral.

SECRET

A number of high-ranking Swedish military officers apparently share this view, but it has not at this juncture gained any appreciable public or political support.

15. Despite their official "no-alliance" policy, both the Swedish government and people are pro-Western and anti-Communist. The Swedish people have a deep-seated fear and distrust of the USSR. This distrust is based largely on historical conflicts with Tsarist Russia, which was Sweden's traditional enemy, but it has been strengthened in the postwar period by the USSR's aggressive international policy, incessant Soviet attacks on Sweden's grants of asylum to political refugees, and the recent disclosure of Soviet espionage in Sweden. Swedish relations with the Soviet Bloc, especially with Poland, have worsened over the past year.

16. Sweden's sympathies, as well as its major economic interests, are with the Western countries, particularly the US and US. Despite reservations over certain aspects of American foreign policy, there is a friendly feeling for the American people. Swedish policy has become more overtly Western in its emphasis since the conflict in Korea, and particularly since overall NATO defensive capabilities have begun to grow.

SECRET

III. POSSIBILITIES OF A CHANGE IN SWEDISH POLICY

17. During the Cold War. Despite its pro-Western and anti-Communist outlook, Sweden is unlikely to change its formal "no-alliance" policy during peacetime, and will firmly resist pressure in this direction. Sweden would be particularly resistant to Soviet threats, although such threats might lead the Swedes to take a more cautious approach in their relations with the West. Sweden might be forced to make further limited economic concessions to the Soviet bloc in response to such economic warfare measures as a threat to deny it Polish coal. It would not yield, however, to Soviet pressures to alter its foreign or military policies.

18. On the other hand, the Swedes apparently believe that the advantages of joining NATO would be outweighed by a definite increase in international tension and possibly by Soviet occupation of Finland. Moreover, most Swedes, relatively satisfied with the state of their own defenses, have been unimpressed to date with NATO military assistance to Norway and Denmark.

- 13 -  
SECRET

SECRET

19.

25X1C

25X1C

25X1C

The Swedes, however, would be very

sensitive to any hint of Western pressure in these negotiations, which might only increase their wariness.

20. Although opposition leaders have contended that the disappearance of Finland as a buffer for Sweden would necessitate reconsideration of Sweden's policy, we do not believe that Sweden would join NATO/ if the USSR occupied Finland. A recent public opinion poll indicates that only 26% of the people would favor a departure from neutrality in this event. The Swedish government's initial reaction would probably not be determined so much by the reduction of Finland to satellite status as by its assessment of what the next Soviet step would be. Only if if were convinced that

SECRET

Finland was merely a springboard for an early Soviet military move into Sweden would it probably make overtures to the West for some form of military ties. On the other hand, if Sweden believed the USSR intended to move no further than Finland, it would almost certainly not make any immediate overt change in its no-alliance policy. Sweden would almost certainly expand its own defense preparations,

25X1C

25X1C

Moreover, the progressive buildup of a Soviet military threat from nearby Finland, and the influx of Finnish refugees, would almost certainly create a public opinion increasingly hostile to the USSR and therefore would gradually make the Swedish government more willing to engage in some form of military cooperation with the West.

21. In event of war. We believe that Sweden would still prefer to remain neutral as long as possible, particularly if Norway were not directly attacked. As long as Norway were not invaded, the Swedes would hope that the area might not become an active theater of operations and

that Sweden could keep open some lines of communication with the West.

Even if Denmark were invaded, which seems likely in the initial stages of a conflict between the USSR and NATO, the Swedes probably still would maintain their neutral position although in the event of such a war they would certainly mobilize and might secretly consult with the Western Powers over joint defense measures in case Norway and Sweden were attacked.

22. A Soviet attack on Norway, even though it bypassed Sweden, would require the government to decide then whether to fight or to risk being almost completely isolated from the West. Although government leaders have been reserved on this point, we believe that they might regard an attack on Norway as necessitating the entry of Sweden into the war, especially if by that time NATO was militarily strong enough to extend immediate large-scale assistance. If, however, the attack should come before NATO strength had been built up and the government then believed that quick and adequate Western aid would not be forthcoming, Sweden might decide to remain neutral.

SECRET

23. If Sweden itself were attacked by the USSR, we believe that it would resist with all its resources. Public opinion polls have indicated that 75% of the Swedish people are determined to resist Soviet attack, while only 7% favor non-resistance. If Sweden were invaded and occupied, remnants of the Swedish forces would flee to Allied territory, and the Swedes would almost certainly attempt guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations.

IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE SWEDISH COURSES OF ACTION.

24. Swedish adherence to NATO during the Cold War. The inclusion in NATO of Sweden's potential military strength would increase NATO capabilities for the defense of Scandinavia and provide an additional deterrent to Soviet attack. It would permit advance planning and coordination with the NATO Northern Command, facilitate Western military advice and assistance in building up Sweden's defenses, and give a sharp boost to Norwegian and Danish morale. Given MDAF aid (which the Swedes could largely pay for), Sweden's defense capabilities, together with those of the NATO Northern Command, could

SECRET

be built up over several years to a point sufficient to withstand a Soviet assault or to make such an assault too costly for the USSR to undertake.

*On Other hand*

25. While Swedish adherence to NATO would increase international tensions, it almost certainly would not be considered as a casus belli by the USSR. However, it might lead the USSR to occupy Finland or at least to secure further concessions from the Finns.

25X1C



SECRET

SECRET

27. Continued Swedish neutrality during the Cold War. Continued

Swedish neutrality makes difficult the development of effective Scandinavian defenses. It makes joint planning and coordination difficult if not impossible, denies Sweden full access to NATO military advice and assistance, and hampers NATO efforts to induce Sweden to strengthen its own defenses. On the other hand Sweden's continued adherence to a "no-alliance" policy has certain advantages to the West. Soviet policy toward Finland is probably somewhat restrained by a desire not to alienate Sweden. Moreover, Sweden's East-West trade controls already parallel those of the European NATO countries, and are likely to continue to do so.

28. Swedish Neutrality in Event of War. The consequences of Sweden's neutrality during wartime would vary according to the military strength of the NATO powers and the resultant willingness of the USSR to undertake a Scandinavian campaign. Should war come during the period of NATO weakness and before Norway in particular could be adequately defended, the USSR would probably bypass Sweden and launch an early invasion of Norway primarily through

Denmark. By observing Sweden's neutrality the USSR would (a) avoid the necessity of diverting large forces to cope with the Swedish forces; (b) avoid damage to the Swedish industrial establishment as a result of the fighting and of a Swedish "scorched earth" campaign; and (c) avoid the necessity of occupying Sweden and of coping with probable guerrilla warfare. Moreover, once the USSR had occupied Norway and Denmark, Sweden would be almost wholly isolated and its considerable exports to Western Europe would be cut off. The USSR, through its control over Sweden's essential imports, could then force Sweden to re-orient its trade toward the Soviet bloc and to contribute to the Soviet war economy.

29. On the other hand, Swedish neutrality, if respected by the USSR, would also be of value to the Allies. The USSR would be deprived of the most direct avenues of attack against Norway, or should it succeed in occupying Norway, of its most direct line of communications to its Norwegian bases;

25X6

probably give refuge to fleeing Danish and Norwegian forces; and it would

probably become a base for resistance activities in these countries and in Finland. Once the USSR had isolated Sweden, however, it would probably place increasing pressure on the Swedish government to halt these activities, and Sweden would be compelled to comply at least partially.

30. Despite its neutrality, Sweden would probably not actively resist the overflight of Western aircraft, although it would officially protest. Particularly if these overflights were at high altitude, the Swedes might only go through the motion of interception and AA fire, and the strongly pro-Western airforce might actually assist lost or disabled Western aircraft. Sweden would more actively defend its neutrality against Soviet overflights, although not to the point of creating serious complications with the USSR. After Sweden had been isolated through Soviet occupation of Norway, however, the government might feel compelled by Soviet pressure to protest more strongly and take more active measures against Western overflights. Even in this case, the Swedish air force would be unlikely to carry out in practice the more stringent measures ordered by the government itself.

31. Once NATO strength had grown sufficiently to enable Western Europe to be held and Norway in particular to be adequately defended, the USSR might not be able to divert sufficient forces for an early Scandinavian campaign, and Sweden could no longer be wholly isolated by the USSR. Sweden would then be less vulnerable to Soviet economic pressures and could still conduct limited trade with the West. Under these circumstances, however, the USSR would probably look upon Swedish neutrality as advantageous, as it would screen the Soviet Baltic flank and would prevent the NATO powers from making offensive use of Swedish bases.

32. Swedish belligerency in event of war. If Sweden declared war as a result of a Soviet attack on Norway, or if Sweden were itself attacked, the USSR would be compelled to employ substantially larger forces and overall Scandinavian defense capabilities would be considerably increased. Whether or not the NATO powers would be thus enabled to hold substantial areas in Scandinavia, however, would depend upon: (a) the strength of the NATO and Swedish forces at the time war came; (b) the time they had to mobilize; and (c) the outside assistance with NATO could provide.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

33. During 1952, at least, it seems unlikely that the Swedish and NATO forces would be able to conduct any more than a prolonged delaying action, although isolated parts of Norway might be held. Logistical and other problems would make difficult adequate and timely NATO assistance to the Swedish forces. However, Swedish delaying action might gain valuable time for NATO reinforcement of Norway, and those Swedish forces which could retreat into Norway would be able to assist in its defense. Moreover, even if Sweden were overrun, the consequent destruction of Swedish factories, transport lines, etc., as well as continuing guerrilla warfare might seriously reduce Soviet ability to utilize Swedish facilities and resources after Sweden had been occupied.

34. On the other hand, if general war did not occur for several years, Swedish defense capabilities might have developed to the point where the addition of Sweden's forces to those of NATO, particularly if these forces were given time to mobilize, might enable a successful defense of large areas of Sweden or at least Norway against any Soviet attack. Should the combined NATO-Swedish forces be able by this time to hold large areas of Scandinavia,

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

bases would be available for air and perhaps eventual naval and amphibious operations against the Soviet Baltic flank. The logistical difficulties of supplying NATO forces in Sweden in the face of probable Soviet local air superiority in the Baltic would doubtless limit NATO use of bases in Sweden itself, but the valuable Norwegian coastal bases would be protected and Soviet egress from the Baltic made more hazardous.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~